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Abstract
Islamic identity has been a central issue since the emergence of Islam in the
seventh century. Muslims have been interacted with many symbols of religious
identity since this early time of Islam. Every generation of Muslims has their own
way to show their religious identity. Muslims in Britain are also still continuing to
search for religious identity. They seek to re-evaluate their identity and construct
a sense of what it means to be a Muslim in Britain today. This article would like to
elaborate several discussions on Muslims’ identities in Britain. There are two
different opinions on this issue. The first opinion comes from Muslims who be-
lieve that a Muslim individual should choose to be either a Muslim or a British.
They argue that national values differ from religious norms. The second, how-
ever, states that one Muslim can be both a Muslim and a British at the same time.
For them, there is no contradiction between being a Muslim and being a British
citizen. They argue that nationality and faith can be combined in Muslim individu-
als who live in Britain.
Identitas keIslaman telah menjadi isu utama sejak awal kemunculan Islam pada
awal ketujuh Masehi. Sejak awal, Muslim sudah berinteraksi dengan berbagai
symbol identitas keagamaan. Setiap generasi Muslim memiliki cara tersendiri
untuk menunjukkan identitas kegamaan mereka. Begitu juga dengan generasi
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Muslim saat ini di Inggris, mereka masih mencari identitas keagamaan mereka.
Mereka berusaha mengevaluasi kembali dan mencari makna bagaimana menjadi
Muslim di Inggris. Artikel ini ingin mengelaborasi beberapa diskusi mengenai
identitas Muslim di Inggris. Terdapat dua perbedaan pandangan terkait hal ini.
Pendapat pertama datang dari Muslim yang percaya bahwa seorang Muslim harus
memilih menjadi Muslim atau seorang warga Inggris. Mereka berpendapat bahwa
nilai-nilai nasional Inggris berbeda dari norma-norma agama. Namun yang kedua,
menyatakan bahwa seorang Muslim bisa menjadi Muslim Inggris pada waktu
bersamaan. Bagi mereka, tidak ada perbedaan untuk menjadi Muslim atau menjadi
warga Negara Inggris. Mereka berpendapat bahwa keimanan dan nasionalisme
bisa disatukan dalam diri seorang Muslim yang tinggal di Inggris.
Keywords: Islamic identity; National Identity; British Muslims; Islam
Introduction
Since the beginning of Islam, Muslims have their own theology, law,
religious rituals, and so on that differ from other faiths such as Judaism
and Christianity. Apart from this, every Muslim also has their own ways
to show their religious identities through their opinion on contemporary
religious issues and their daily attitudes and performances. The differ-
ence of beliefs and practices has been influenced by various under-
standing and attitudes toward the fundamental source of Islam. Mus-
lims’ understanding of the Quran and the Hadith will affect their ap-
proaches in responding variety of modern issues. There are many
approaches and reactions of Muslims to modernity which try to ad-
dress the specific place of their religion in modern life. The place of
religion in public life is the core issue for today’s Islam everywhere
including in Britain. Many problems have emerged and should be faced
in various social, political, economic and legal aspects of life. These
aspects are very crucial for defining modernity and its compatibility with
Muslims’ lives.
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The estimated number of Muslims in Britain in 2010 was 2.8 million.
This Muslim population spread in many cities, mainly in major cities
such as London, Birmingham, Leicester, Manchester, Bradford and Leeds.
They seek to re-evaluate their identity and construct a sense of what it
means to be Muslim in Britain today.1 There are various discussions on
Muslims’ identity. The discussions revolve around two criteria: a Muslim
and a British. Both identities of being a British and a Muslim sometimes
create problems for Muslims due to dissimilarities between their reli-
gious and national values.
There are two different responses regarding this idea. The first
response comes from the Salafist and Wahhabist Muslims who believe
that the individual should choose to be either a Muslim or a British.
They argue that national values differ from religious norms. The sec-
ond response, however, states that one can be both Muslim and Brit-
ish. There is no contradiction between being a Muslim and being a
British citizen. This position argues that nationality and faith can be
combined in Muslim individuals who live in Britain. This response comes
from what I called as modernist Muslims. This difference in outlook
between the Salafist and modernist Muslims is influenced by their dif-
ference in approach and method of interpretation of the primary sources
of Islam, namely the Quran and the Hadith.
This article is therefore to analyze the dynamic interpretation of Is-
lamic identity according to Salafist or other Fundamentalist Muslims and
modernist Muslims in Britain. The fundamentalist and modernist Muslims
in Britain will be studied in terms of their ways and opinions in addressing
the problems of being a Muslim and a British. This issue of Islamic
identity is interesting since it is highly debated among European scholars.
1See T. Choudhury, The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation, London: Department
for Communities and Local Government, 2007.
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Salafist and other fundamentalist Muslims in Britain
According to Geaves2, the beliefs and practices which exist in Britain
reflect the varieties of spirituality which survive in most countries of
origin. Hamid insists that the existence of most ideological and theologi-
cal trends in Britain emerged in the 1960s and 1970s with the arrival of
South Asian settler communities.3 Yet, it is said that the Salafi ideas
occurred in the late 1980s.4 Therefore, it is important to appreciate the
diversity of the Islamic movement in the global context in order to
understand the similar movements in Britain. The next elaboration will
explain the representation of Salafist and Wahhabist in Britain and the
religious-cultural contexts of their emergence. Also, we will explore how
some Salafist and Wahhabist were portrayed as fundamentalist move-
ments, while others were more flexible in accommodating the contem-
porary Muslim needs.
In Britain, there is an institution like JIMAS (Jam’iyat Ihya Minhaj al-
Sunnah) which is concerned with promoting and spreading Salafism.
They call their organization  “the society for the revival of the prophetic
way”. Through their website, they actively disseminate and spread
Salafism.5 The key figure of this organization is Manwar Ali, who is
called the father of ‘Salafi dakwah’. Salafism spread among young
British Muslims as a result of his efforts in promoting Salafism in mosques,
universities and community centre.6 Hamid and Birt state that there
are several mosques and institutions that openly identify themselves
2Ron Geaves, The Sufis of Britain, Cardiff: Cardiff Academic Press, 2000.
3Sadek Hamid, “The Development of British Salafism”,  ISIM Review, Volume 21 (Spring 2008),
21.
4Yahya Birt,  “Wahhabism in the United Kingdom: Manifestations and Reactions”,  in M. Al-
Rasheed (ed.), Transnational Connection and the Arab Gulf, London and New York: Routledge,
2005.
5See http://www.jimas.org
6See Hamid, “The Development of British Salafism”…, 21.
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as Salafi, such as the Green Lane Mosques in Birmingham, Salafi Insti-
tute in Birmingham, Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque in Brixton and the Islamic
Centre of Luton.7
 Besides being promoted institutionally, the main Salafi vision has
continued to be promoted individually by new generations of ideologues
who were Western converts, such as Bilal Philips and Daoud Birbank.8
Wahhabi as described above is a shared belief that Islam should be
stripped of cultural accretions and innovations. The innovations are
perceived as contrary to the Quranic teachings. In Britain, there are a
number of reform movements that disseminate such beliefs. These
movements had arrived with the migrants from the subcontinent.
Wahhabi in Britain may include some Deobandis, who have an agenda
to safeguard Islam through correct religious education.9 Other Deobandis
still practise Sufism. That is caused, perhaps, by the fact that there
are two pathways for Deobandis: one which is much closer to funda-
mentalist Muslims and the other to modernist Muslims. The former are
represented by Deoband reformers like Sayyid Ahmad Khan  (d. 1898)
who recommended learning from Western sciences and technology,
while the latter advocated that Islam could be revitalized by a return to
a pristine Islam based on a perceived ideal community of early Muslims
(Salaf al-Salih). Other Muslim groups that are considered as Wahhabi
are Jama’at-i Islami, Ahl Quran, Ahl Hadith and Tabligh-i Jama’at. These
four Muslim groups identify themselves as non-political organizations
concerned with promoting the correct Islamic doctrines to fellow Mus-
7See Hamid, “The Development of British Salafism”…, 21 and Birt, “Wahhabism in the United
Kingdom”…, 177.
8Ron Geaves, “Learning the Lessons from the Neo-Revivalist and Wahabi Movement: the
Counterattack of New Sufi Movements in the UK”, in Malik and Hinnels (eds.), Sufism in the West,
New York: Routledge, 2006,  146.
9See Ron Geaves, The Sufis of Britain…, 53.
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lims. One characteristic of these Muslim organizations is their critical
attitude to Sufism. Nevertheless, Geaves divided these groups into
two factions. The first comprises the Wahhabi and Salafi movements
who oppose Sufism in any form, while the second consists of Tabligh-i
Jama’at and Deobandi who only oppose popular Sufism, represented in
holy places of worship.10
The Deobandis have their roots in the reformist movement in India.
Initially, they were the Deoband schools and colleges who were con-
cerned only with Muslims’ education. The aim of the founder was to
help Muslims to save their faith from any impurity arising from contact
with other religious beliefs and practices existing in India. The next
development saw Deobandi become more than educational institu-
tions.11 They were established as independent schools of thought whose
aim was to revive Islam through performed efforts to purify the faith.
The Deobandi were concerned with ways of maintaining Islam as a
living social force in a non-Muslim culture.
The Deobandis were growing rapidly in Britain. In 1967, they had
founded Majlis Ulama UK, an organization for managing their religious
activities and issuing the fatawa. The fatawa were issued as guidance
for Muslims to practise a pure Islam. The Deobandis are concerned
with providing an imam (religious leader) who is able to be a Muslim
leader both inside and outside the mosques. The Deobandi were also
responding to the needs of young Muslims by establishing a Da>r ul-
‘Ulu>m network to train young Muslims to be Imams, capable of helping
Muslims face various problems in Britain. However, according to Geaves,
the Deobandi’s reform agendas in Britain have now developed into the
radical programs of the twentieth century Islamic movement.12 Their
10See for further explanation, Geaves, The Sufis of Britain…, 53.
11See Geaves, “Learning the Lessons from the Neo-Revivalist and Wahabi Movement”…, 144.
12See Geaves, “Learning the Lessons from the Neo-Revivalist and Wahabi Movement”…, 146.
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political agendas are going to revolutionize Islam. They have remained
conservative on maintaining the traditions as established in India. For
instance, the Imams from Deoband are focused on removing the rural
customs of Indian Muslims, which they regard as bid’a.
The Deobandis in Britain are considered by Modood to be apoliti-
cal.13 However, the facts in Pakistan and Afghanistan show that they
are political. They tried to be independent from the British state. This
anti-Britishness influenced their choice in taking a non-cooperation stance
against the British policies. The Deobandis have no notion of an Islamic
state. Tabligh-i Jama’at is a worldwide organization which was built by
the Deobandis. Their national headquarters is in West Yorkshire and
they have an active presence in Birmingham. Ahl Hadith was consid-
ered to be a brand of fundamentalism which was inspired by the char-
ismatic leadership of the late Maulana Mypurey and which has been
quite influential in Birmingham.
 Geaves states that the Salafi and Wahhabi reformers in Britain are
“promoting a ‘de-culturalized Islam’ that apparently conforms to sa-
cred text”.14 They are effectively pointing out that the differences are
caused by the variety of cultures in which Islam has installed itself.
They call on young British Muslims to strive for unity based on the
Quran and Sunna and to demolish the bid’a (innovation) of cultural
accretions. Geaves insists that the Salafi and Wahhabi in Britain gained
an advantage from the diaspora location which brings together com-
munities of Muslims from diverse countries of origin.
The other ideological movement in Britain which was identified as
Salafi is Hizbut Tahrir. The main objective of this organization is to
13See in T. Modood et all (eds.), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship; A European Ap-
proach, London and New York: Routledge, 2006.
14Ron Geaves, “Tradition, Innovation and Authentication: Replicating the ‘Ahl Sunna wa
Jama’at’ in Britain”, Comparative Islamic Studies, Volume 1, No 1 (2005).
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establish an Islamic state as the platform for the correct interpretation
of Islamic beliefs and practices. Hizbut Tahrir is considered by many
scholars as the representation of the radical movement that was sig-
nificantly influenced by Wahhabism. They strive to establish sharia and
an Islamic caliphate. Moreover they assess that democracy is not
compatible with Islamic doctrines. Furthermore they believe that God is
the owner of sovereignty. The implementation of sharia, for them, is a
logical consequence of God’s sovereignty. Besides that, they have less
appreciation of other religions. They are recognized as having intoler-
ant attitudes towards other religious communities.  Several pieces of
research even reported that terror bombing is one of the intolerant
actions conducted by them. In this context, they believe that the
world is divided into two areas: the Islamic area (da>r al-Isla>m) and kufr
area (da>r al-kufr or da>r al-h}arb). Also, people are divided into Muslim
(friend) and kafir or infidel/enemy.15 According to their interpretation of
the Quran and Hadith, God called upon Muslims to fight against infidels.
The modernist Muslims in Britain
In Britain, modernist Muslims, to some extent, are those who are
supportive of core liberal values about the separation of religion and
politics and individual choices of liberalism. They support some liberal
values yet they also reject some liberal practices. This is a distinguish-
ing factor of modernist Muslims from liberal or secular Muslims. They
propagate a ‘new’ Islamic theology that adapts to the principles of a
democratic society. They can also be identified by the same character-
istics that I mentioned earlier. Generally, they seek to accommodate
Islamic and Western values through moderation.
15See Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994.
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Moderate strategies can be found in many Islamic institutions and
organizations. They managed to transform Islamic teachings into
Western and secular values or transform secular norms into Islamic
values. Basically, they want to provide an Islam that can be received
by both Muslims and Western societies. They hope that the substance
of Islam is able to give good inspiration for both Muslims and Western-
ers. It is an insightful inspiration that helps Muslims to be better Mus-
lims within the secular conditions and to help Westerners to respect
Muslims and Islam as well.
Jama’at–i Islami (JI)-related organizations are some examples of
the Islamic organizations in Britain that are recognized by their moderate
activities. These organizations are commonly associated with JI in Paki-
stan, yet they, too, have a different character. These JI-related orga-
nizations are UK Islamic Mission, Young Muslims UK, The Islamic Soci-
ety of Britain (ISB) and the Islamic Foundation. These organizations
have adapted the ideological ideas of Mawdudi and the movement
patterns of JI in Pakistan. Nevertheless, they have an awareness and
willingness to promote Islam within the context of the wider British
society. They do not take a position as an enemy of the West. By
contrast, they want to make Islam exist successfully in the UK, and help
Muslims to integrate within British society.16 It shows that the organiza-
tions do not reject the British economic and political system. Moreover
they tend to be open-minded to Western culture and they take advan-
tage of the progress of Western civilizations and achievements.
In general, the JI-related organizations are trying to accommodate
modernity within their organizational movements. They attempt to play
a part in social and political activities as British Muslims. They consider
16See Geaves, “Learning the Lessons from the Neo-Revivalist and Wahabi Movement”…, 29.
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these activities as ways to avoid isolation among the wider British soci-
ety and at the same time to gain public recognition from the state.
Besides Islamic institutions and organizations, there are also Muslim
figures like Tariq Ramadan who promotes what is called a progressive
inclusive Islam. He promotes moderate Islam through peaceful ways.
This scholar widely influences the attitudes and thoughts of British
Muslims. His appearance at public lectures or seminars is keenly
expected by many Muslims, particularly the younger generations.
Interestingly, there is a phenomenon among young Deobandis and
Barelwis in terms of their accommodation with modern and national
issues. These youngsters of Deobandi and Barelwi have different
concerns and tendencies from their elders in responding to social issues
in Britain. They, in contrast to their parents, actively engage in the
discussions and movements in various political, social and cultural issues.
They are also very active in publishing Islamic books, magazines and
websites which try to attract the attention of young and middle-class
Muslims in Britain. These younger generations of Deobandi and Barelwi
and other young Muslims are sometimes considered to be modernist
Muslims.
Identity and the British Muslims
Many thinkers on identity, such as Goffman, Sandstrom and Bhabha
state that individual identities emerge, develop and are constructed
through social interaction.17 Identity is not automatically given when
someone is born. It is also not a biological consequence of the person.
An individual should learn who he or she is by interacting with other
17E. Goffman, The Presentation of Every Day Life, New York and Company, 1959; H. Bhabha,
The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994; A. Sandstrom, Corn is Our Blood: Culture and
Ethnic Identity in a Contemporary Azten Indian Village, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press,
2001.
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people. By his or her interaction with others, they will identify them-
selves.
Goffman, for instance, states that there is no real self-identity. In
addition he argues that self-identity is only a mask and is used in
theatrical situations. Goffman assumes that daily interactions can be
understood as the space where actors manipulate and dominate an
individual’s self-identity. Sandstrom says that the individual’s self-iden-
tity is based on what others construct about him. An individual will care
about what people think about him.
Bhabha stated that there is no valid reference on personal identity.
So far, a person knows his personal identity as a social construction.
Identity is constructed, for instance, by certain socio-political institu-
tions, religious institutions, and ethnicity. People are identified by their
religion, language, race, ethnicity, culture, social class, and nation. As a
consequence, identity is considered by some people as capable of
providing a sense of security for individuals or social groups. Identity
also gives a view of life, social status, ways of thinking, and ethics.
Moreover, Brennan asserts that such a social construction is possibly
contradictive, so that in this situation people often feel ambiguous.18
Lewis also confirms that there is a complexity and variety of different
identities which can be held by an individual or group at the same time.19
That is why identity in Muslim societies is still defined from several
perspectives.20 Muslims in general saw and determined their identity by
traditional criteria such as family, religious community and neighbor-
18T. Brennan, At Home in the World; Cosmopolitan Now, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1994.
19See Phillip Lewis, Islamic Britain, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994.
20K. Mas’ud, “Religious Identity and Mass Education” in Johan Meuleman, Islam in the Era of
Globalization; Muslim Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity. London and USA: Routledge,
2002, 233.
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hood. Besides that, place of origin, family, etc, are the markers of
identity, yet religion is still the most common denominator. It is gener-
ally believed that religion makes a contribution in constructing the iden-
tity of a particular social group. As a religious identity, Islam can be
identified through its belief system and culture.
The identity of Muslims is not a given. Identification with various
cultural symbols or behaviors is socially constructed. To simplify, clothes,
religious symbols, language, and behaviors can be categorized as ele-
ments of identity. That is why people identify Muslims with these kinds
of elements. In the beginning of Islam’s development, the Prophet of
Muhammad neither obliged Muslims to wear certain symbols nor com-
manded them to conform completely to certain behavior. Islamic iden-
tity was created culturally over the years. In addition, Muslims’ at-
tempt to express and realize Islamic teaching is one of the factors
leading them to create a certain identity. During several centuries,
Muslims constructed their identity based on different social, political,
and cultural contexts. It is not surprising if some Muslims’ identity
differs in each period and country. Muslims in the Middle East, for
instance, can wear different clothes from Muslims in Asia.
The explanations above indicate that Muslim religious identity has
been defined on more than one basis. Muslim religious identity is shaped
by sociological, theological and other factors. Muslims, in many cases,
are also identified by their adherence to different Islamic schools of law
or Sufi groups. Mas’ud, however, explains that the conception of Is-
lamic identity based on a theological view differed significantly from
Sufism and Islamic laws.21 Moreover, Sufism and Islamic law encour-
aged and honored the difference of views while theology does not allow
21See Mas’ud, “Religious Identity and Mass Education”…, 235.
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diversity in religious identity. He gives the example that a Muslim can
be an Ash’arite in theology, a Malikite in Islamic law and a Qadirite in
Sufism.
That is why there are debates among scholars about Muslims’ iden-
tity, particularly in this contemporary context. They discuss the bound-
aries of identity. The extent to which Muslims recognize or neglect their
identity is an important question in the debate. Generally, there is a
problem that appears in those Muslim societies which exist within West-
ern communities. They realize that there are other identities which are
different from their own identity. In such a condition they might have
two options: place them within a boundary or live with many identities.
In a multi-identity situation, to a certain extent, fundamentalists
tend to create imaginary boundaries to protect their communal iden-
tity. These imaginary boundaries, such as wearing a long veil (h}ija >b)
for women, or beards for men, have an impact on their psychological
relationship with Muslim society. Meanwhile, modernist Muslims attempt
to negotiate Western culture with their Islamic identity. For them, to be
a British Muslim is much easier than contradicting Western traditions
with Islamic identity. They believe that both traditions have many simi-
larities in values, norms and cultures.
In British and European contexts, Ramadan insists that defining
Muslim identity is difficult because many factors relate to this analy-
sis.22 Ramadan questions further; is there a Muslim identity? If so, is it
of a religious or cultural nature? Many researchers such as Ramadan,
Rippin, Joly and Imtiaz have conducted studies about Muslim identity in
Britain in its various aspects.
22Tareq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, the United Kingdom: the Islamic Foundation,
2002,153.
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Identity is divided into two levels, individual and institutional. An
individual’s identity is a personal one that is associated by many schol-
ars such as Ramadan and Rippin23 with a distinctive Islamic ritual prac-
tice such as shahada (witness of faith), salat (prayer), siyam (fast-
ing), zakat (charity) and hajj (pilgrimage). These five pillars of Islam
are ritual practices that are considered by Muslims to be their core self-
identity. Moreover, the Islamic identity is not only limited to these rituals
but also covers social aspects. This is what is called institutional identity.
It is necessary for Muslims to be concerned with both their personal
rituals and their social activities. Yet, there are differences among Mus-
lims on how to conceptualize Islam in a modern era at both the indi-
vidual and institutional levels.
A study done by Joly and Imtiaz focuses on identity in terms of the
relationship between being Muslim and being a citizen in Britain. Accord-
ing to Joly and Imtiaz, research on British Muslim identity needs to
combine the subjective aspects of what it means to be a British Muslim
citizen as measured by attitudes, and the subjective aspects of iden-
tity as measured by participation in citizenship. Joly and Imtiaz see
that, at all levels of society, there is a common acceptance that one
can be Muslim and a British citizen.24
Therefore, identity is considered as an important feature of the
Muslim individual. There are certain characteristics that distinguish Muslims
from other religious communities such as rite, dress code and gender
role. Some scholars, like Hall, state that identity is integrated, stable
and independent.25 Others believe that identities are much more a
process of change and continuity rather than a static attribute. Identi-
23See Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim..., 153
24Joly and Imtiaz, Muslims and Citizenship in the United Kingdom,  Aldershot,  2002.
25See Hall, Cultural Identity and Diaspora,1993.
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ties are replaced by social and dialectical notions. Identities are con-
structed by the interactions of history, cultures and societies and the
dynamic processes of change.26
It is said by Afshar that self-identifications are shaped contextually
by many factors. Muslims in Britain could have many identification
positions, such as identities based on religion, culture, class, gender or
race.27 McLoughlin considered that the representations of identity and
belonging that Muslims make are always contingent and dependent.
The religious identity is also an unstable identity that changes according
to its social condition. Lewis insists that identity experiences an evolu-
tion of the ways in which Muslims perceive themselves.28 Ed Husain
describes in his book, “The Islamist”, the transformation of his religious
identity from Sufi, a member of a radical Muslim organization, to mod-
ernist Muslim.29
As Lewis believes that Muslims, as immigrants, naturally bring their
own concepts and perceptions of identity, I need to understand their
own identity which is considered to be significantly different from that
of Europe. Hence, in the next subchapter I want to elaborate further
about the concept of identity according to fundamentalist and modern-
ist Muslims. Moreover, I want to examine whether or not the concept
of identity changes because of the simultaneous interaction between
their own identity and European identity.
26See Afshar, H et all, 273.
27Sean McLoughlin, ‘In the Name of Umma: Globalization, ‘Race’ Relations and Muslim Identity
Politics in Bradford’, in Shadid, W.A.R and P.S. Van Koningsveld (eds.), Political Participation and
Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1996, 206-228.
28See Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim, London and New York: Continuum, 2007, 3.
29See Ed Husain, The Islamist: Why I joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I saw Inside and
Why I left,  2008.
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The British fundamentalist Muslim’s view on Islamic identity
In general, the previous elaborations on Salafi and Wahabi in Britain
show that Salafis Muslims in Britain are influenced by Muslim thinkers
and organizations that established in the Islamic world. This Salafis
group in Britain have similar opinions and concerns to their Salafis part-
ner worldwide. The British Salafis Muslims believe that Muslims should
not be ruled by a secular government. This view comes from Qutb
who lay down that Muslims must answer to God alone and that human
government is illegitimate.
This is absolutely the doctrine which led some fundamentalist Mus-
lims in Britain to take part in the London bombings and other riots in
Britain. They believe that secular government is a target for jihad.
They argue that secular government should be taken over by Islamic
rulers and systems. For them, it is a religious duty to change Britain
into an Islamic society. Philips believes that this doctrine is undoubtedly
the basis of Islamism which believes that the entire world should be
conquered by Islam. Like Qutb’s doctrine, Mawdudi’s ideas also spread
among British Muslims. The doctrine on the absolute sovereignty of
God is promoted by the Islamic Foundation in Leicester. In 1982, when
the Islamic Foundation was declared, they said that “the Islamic move-
ment is an organized struggle to change the existing society into an
Islamic society”.30
As a result of these radical doctrines, they call upon Muslims to
show their Islamic identity. For them, Islamic identity, like veils for
Muslim women, is not only considered a religious duty but also shows
the supremacy of Islam. Identity is believed by fundamentalist Mus-
30Quoted by Melanie Philips, Londonistan: How Britain is creating a Terror State Within,
London: Gibson Square, 2006, 142-143 from www.chroniclesmagazine.org
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lims in Britain to be an Islamic marker that should be strengthened to
Islamize the secular Britain.
In this study, Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is categorized as the representa-
tion of British fundamentalist Islam. Although HT is not part of the
Wahabi movement, HT’s ideology is based on Salafi. Since the emer-
gence of HT until the present day, HT has eagerly fought for an
Islamic caliphate. As a consequence, HT totally rejects Western politi-
cal systems like democracy and secularism. HT’s position relative to
the identity issue is clear. They insist on establishing an Islamic identity,
especially in the political system. HT emphasizes the importance of
British Muslims’ loyalty to their religious identity rather than to their
country. In addition, they oppose any Western influences in the Muslim
world and reject democracy as being Western and un-Islamic. The
source of democracy is man and not the shari’ah laws.31 Moreover, the
aim of this organization is to establish a pan-Islamic state by re-estab-
lishing the caliphate and to isolate Muslims from the non-Muslim com-
munity and its culture.32 They claim that Islam is a comprehensive way
of life that is capable of managing affairs of state and society.33
They see Western values such as democracy and human rights as
being incompatible with Islamic values. Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, the
founder of this organization condemned democracy as a system of
unbelief that is incompatible with sharia.34 He also said that there is a
big distinction between democratic notions and shura35. This opinion
has lead the HT to reject the adoption of the British culture. For them,
31Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic
Caliphate, London: Grey Seal, 1996, 69.
32Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim, London and New York: Continuum, 2007, 121.
33See http:// www.hizb.org.uk
34See Taji Farouki, A Fundamental Quest…, 69.
35Shura is discussing an opinion in Islamic tradition.
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Muslims in Britain should choose whether to be British or Muslims.
Shiraz Maher, one of the ex-members of Hizbut Tahrir, said that the
discussion topics revolved around the revival of the caliphate, the es-
tablishment of a pan-Islamic state and the duty of Muslims to pre-
serve Islam from America. These were the most important issues
discussed among the members.36
It indicates that HT struggles to bind British Muslim society with
Islamic identity. As far as I am concerned, they do not focus on dress
or other symbols. They place more emphasis on Islamic political iden-
tity. For them, it is impossible to be a Muslim comprehensively without
the Islamic political system. That is why there are two choices: whether
to be Muslim or British. According to them, Muslims should totally follow
all Islamic teaching aspects.
The British modernist Muslim’s view on Islamic identity
Jama’ati Islami (JI)-related organizations are classified as British
modernist Muslims. They have different opinions from fundamentalist
Muslims on Islamic identity. Their view on identity is the main factor
that allows them to easily adjust to the British culture. They have a
willingness to be flexible in responding to modern changes. Their flexibil-
ity is rooted in their view about ijtihad (independent reasoning) from
Mawdudi, who said that the gate of ijtihad is never closed.37
These modernist Muslims attempt to form Islam within the context
of the British society. That is why, to some extent, their approaches to
disseminating Islamic values are interesting for many Muslims, particu-
larly young, educated, professional Muslims. Above all, their ways of
thinking are increasingly influenced by moderate-progressive Muslim
36See Lewis, Young, British and Muslim…, 119.
37See Taji farouki, Young, British and Muslim…, 55.
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thinkers. Interestingly, most members of those Islamic groups listed
above are also the activists of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB),
because JI-related organizations may be home to significant members
or activists who have the energy to drive the political network of the
organization. The MCB was established in 1997, stating its constitu-
ency as ‘British Citizens with an Islamic heritage’. They issued a state-
ment that “there is no contradiction between being loyal British citizens
and being Muslims”. In implementing this statement, they actively sought
to move their members away from their original customs and traditions
so that they focus more on identifying themselves as British Muslim.
This organization pays attention to the diversity of young Muslims’
backgrounds and the radical changes in their lives. Therefore, their
main concern was to keep Islam alive for younger generations as a
living option.38 These organizations are basically promoting Islam within
the wider British society. They did not consider the West to be an
enemy, in contrast to the views of the radical-fundamentalist groups.
The descriptions above shows that to a certain extent British mod-
ernist Muslims have also promoted Islamic identity. They disseminate
Islamic values among British Muslims but they do not ask Muslims to
see a contradiction between Islam and British values. According to
them, Islam is a universal set of values that can be implemented within
the secular British culture.
Young British Muslims and the emergence of a new Muslim identity
in Britain
The calls from fundamentalist Muslims for other Muslims to follow the
identity which they believe to be an ideal identity will not be followed by
38See Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identities among British Muslims,
London and New York: I.B Tauris Publisher, 1994; Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim,  London
and New York: Continuum, 2007, 109.
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young Muslims. On the contrary, young Muslims will consider these
calls to be ‘coercion’. They have progressive ideas and choices about
who they want to be. They are searching for an Islamic identity that
fits their religious and social needs. They will look for reliable sources
and references to find their religious identity. The older generations of
both modernist and fundamentalist Muslims should be fully aware of
the demands of young Muslims. The elders cannot ignore the aspects
of psychological and social maturity of young Muslims. They have their
own considerations when they make a decision. They will not directly
follow the instructions of their parents.
There are some indicators that the demands for religious identity
among young British Muslims nowadays are better than in the past.
Firstly, unlike in the past, when many Islamic organizations tended to
choose imported imams and teachers from their home country, there
is now a tendency to employ well-educated teachers and imams. These
shift happened because of the role of young Muslims in managing their
organizations. Young Muslims see that the imported imams were un-
able to fulfill their curiosity about Islamic and modern issues. On Islamic
issues, for instance, the imported imams and teachers strictly laid
down their teaching and speech materials on the traditional and basic
religious teachings. These teaching materials tended to judge and ac-
cuse young Muslims of criminality, trouble-making, impiety, and so on.
On the modern issues, the old imams and teachers tended to judge
democracy and other liberal values as un-Islamic and to be shunned.
Secondly, the current phenomena show that young Muslims are
actively participating in various social and political processes. Their in-
volvements in such fields will gradually improve their ways of thinking
on how Muslims should live within liberal values. Their involvement will
have advantages for both Muslims and non-Muslims.  Muslims will
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understand that liberal values in general do not contradict Islamic norms.
Meanwhile, non-Muslims will understand that Islam and Christianity have
many similarities, particularly in responding to human issues. Many
scholars, such as Lewis39 and Kepel, insisted optimistically that the
prospects for British Islam will be better than in the past. They argue
that young British Muslims seem to be moving in the direction of a
progressive interpretation of their religious and social identity. Young
Muslims will play their role in reconciling Islam and modernity.40
Conclusion
The issue of identity within the British Muslims is very important. First
of all, most British Muslims are from immigrant families. Their original
culture that has mixed or assimilated with Islamic values has a signifi-
cant influence in shaping their view on Muslim identity. In addition, they
maintain Islam not only as a private faith, but also as a reference
point, guiding them to solve social, political, and economic problems. In
other words, when they migrated to Britain, they faced problems re-
garding the demand to adjust to secular culture. In this situation,
British Muslims are challenged with a dilemmatic position. On the one
hand, they have to preserve their original Islamic identity, since it is not
only a religious symbol binding them, but also a set of doctrines guiding
their social lives. On the other hand, they need to adapt to the British
culture, which has a number of different values from their own culture.
The term fundamentalist is used to describe the Salafis, the Wahhabis
and the Hizbut Tahrir movement, since this organization fights to es-
tablish political Islam and to Islamize social, cultural, and economic
aspects of Muslim society in Britain. Meanwhile I categorize Jama’at-i
39See Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim… 2007.
40Gilles Kepel, “The War for Muslim Minds”, Q-News Magazine (January 2005), 42.
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Islami (JI)-related organizations as modernist, because these organi-
zations tend to accept the British economic, cultural, and political sys-
tem. They call upon Muslims to be a British Muslims and to combine
their Islamic values with their British culture. Although these organiza-
tions are influenced by Abul A’la Maududi’s ideas, it does not mean that
they are identical with Maududi’s agenda. I found significant differences
or shifts between these organizations and Maududi’s original thoughts.
The position of HT and other fundamentalist Muslims insists on
totally establishing Islamic teaching through economic, social, and politi-
cal systems. For them, British culture is incompatible with Islam. This
indicates that HT tends to emphasize the Islamic identity. HT rejects
the possibility of modifying Islamic values within the British context.
According to HT, an Islamic caliphate is the best system that has to be
fought for by all Muslims. It proves that, for HT, Islamic identity can-
not be combined with the British identity. Meanwhile, JI-related organi-
zations and other modernist Muslims have different views about this
issue. JI-related organizations and the modernist Muslims in Britain
believe that Islamic identity can be mixed with British identity. British
Muslims could practice their Islamic beliefs and their secular culture as
well. Islam is seen as the basic and universal set of values that can be
placed in the British context.
The debate between the British fundamentalist and modernist Mus-
lims shows that Islamic identity is a crucial problem faced by Muslims
who migrate to Western countries, including Britain. Both fundamental-
ist and modernist Muslims believe that Islam cannot be ignored in their
social lives. They strongly believe in the Quran and the Sunnah as the
source of life. It is the same point for both fundamentalist and mod-
ernist Muslim groups alike. However, modernist Muslims accommo-
dates the advantages and values of the modern British culture while
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fundamentalists strongly believe in the self-sufficiency of Islam. British
modernist Muslims, therefore, are more flexible than fundamentalists
in defining and practicing the principles of Islamic identity because their
core idea is that to be a British Muslim, they will combine both their
national and religious identities.
Finally, however, I realize that both fundamentalist and modernist
terms and classifications are quite theoretical in nature. There are two
problems in using the terms: firstly, there is an overlapping and blurring
of the definitions; and, secondly, the scope of the terms and catego-
ries today differ in names and concerns from those at the beginning of
the 20th century. Nevertheless, I employed these terms only to help
me identify the tendencies of British Muslims in defining their identity.
Yet, it is not easy for me to find precisely the representation of funda-
mentalist and modernist Muslims in Britain. I would therefore find it
interesting to analyze further this categorization in British context in my
future research.
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